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DESEGREGATING LEGAL EDUCATION 
Peggy Cooper Davis 
 
on the occasion of the  
44th Henry J. Miller Distinguished Lecture 
 
March 26, 2009 
Georgia State University College of Law 
 
Langdell: “Mr. Fox, will you state the facts in the  
case of Payne v. Cave?” 
. . . 
“Mr. Rawle, will you give the plaintiff's argument?” 
. . . 
“Mr. Adams do you agree with that?”1 
The Carnegie Foundation’s thoughtful critique of legal education 
has made law faculties across the country more conscious of the 
responsibility we hold as we initiate people into a profession that is 
central to how we function as a society and how we relate to one 
another. Carnegie has a long tradition of holding professions 
accountable for how they define themselves and educate their 
members.2 It is no surprise, then, that its 2007 report on legal 
education triggered fresh and frank assessment of what we teach law 
students, how we teach it and how we measure student learning.  
                                                                                                                 
   John S.R. Shad Professor of Lawyering and Ethics, New York University School of Law. The 
author would like to acknowledge Norman Dorsen of New York University School of Law and the 
students and faculty of the Georgia State University College of Law for providing valued comments. 
 1. HARVARD LAW SCHOOL ASS’N, CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL 1817–
1917, at 34 (1918) [hereinafter HARVARD CENTENNIAL]. 
 2. The Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of teaching was founded in 1905 by Andrew 
Carnegie. In 1910, it produced the landmark “Flexner Report” on medical education. Subsequently, it 
developed the Graduate Record Examination, founded the Educational Testing Service, and created the 
Teachers Insurance Annuity Association of America (TIAA-CREF). Its report on legal education is part 
of its ongoing study of professional education. See http://www.carnegiefoundation.org/about-us/about-
carnegie.  
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I focus here on just one aspect of the Carnegie Report—its 
recommendation that we “integrate” what the Report’s authors call 
the three professional apprenticeships—the cognitive, the ethical and 
the practical.3 Carnegie described the cognitive apprenticeship as the 
indoctrination to legal reasoning that comes mainly in the form of 
Langdellian or Socratic exchanges in large classrooms, and it gave 
the legal academy pretty high marks for managing the cognitive 
apprenticeship. But the Report faulted us rather mercilessly for our 
management of the ethical apprenticeship, which it described as the 
definition and normative critique of professional roles and 
responsibilities, and the practical apprenticeship, which it described 
as the “skills training” that one receives in simulation courses, clinics 
and internships: guidance and practice in legal research, fact 
development, interviewing, counseling, prescriptive drafting and oral 
and written advocacy.4 After documenting our neglect of both the 
ethical and the practical dimensions of professional practice, the 
Report called on us to reform legal education so that it would give 
balanced and integrated attention to the cognitive, the ethical and the 
practical.5  
I accept wholeheartedly the Carnegie criticism that legal education 
wrongfully neglects the ethical and the practical and move on to 
consider what “integration” should mean and how it should be 
achieved. I argue that we cannot respond adequately to the Carnegie 
critique by simply taking care that we have on each law school 
campus a proper mix of Socratic and seminar courses, clinical and 
simulation courses and courses in professional responsibility. We 
must take care not to segregate that which we have neglected, for 
segregation perpetuates misunderstanding and facilitates further 
neglect.  
We segregate the cognitive from the practical and the ethical in 
legal education for a variety of good and bad reasons, not all of which 
                                                                                                                 
 3. WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN, ANNE COLBY, JUDITH WELCH WEGNER, LLOYD BOND, LEE S. 
SHULMAN, EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION OF LAW (2007) (Carnegie 
Report). 
 4. Id. at 12–14.  
 5. Id. at 191–92. 
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I am able to address in this essay. I have made elsewhere a feminist 
argument that cultural and psychological biases incline us to 
ghettoize practical and ethical work and to privilege what we think of 
as cognitive work.6 I stand by that claim, but make a distinct 
argument here: We have segregated “cognitive” development from 
“practical” and “ethical” development in part because we have 
misunderstood and derailed what I will call the Langdellian 
revolution in legal pedagogy.  
Why would I speak of Langdellian pedagogy as “revolutionary”? 
As my colleague Carrie Menkel Meadow recently pointed out, 
Langdell’s approach to legal education has long been challenged for 
its conceptualism and formalism.7 In what follows, I question the 
now generally accepted view of Langdellian method as rigid, 
formalistic and antiquated. I urge that we see it as a step toward a 
more experiential pedagogy of the kind advocated by Dewey and 
other advocates of “progressive” education. I then describe the 
derailment of Langdell’s pedagogical revolution. I end by suggesting 
how we might get legal education back on track. 
I introduce my argument with a personal reminiscence. 
When I was a first year law student in 1965, I sat—mostly in the 
amphitheater-styled classrooms of Langdell Hall—for “Langdellian” 
or “Socratic” classes in Contracts, Torts, Criminal Law, Property, 
Constitutional Law and Civil Procedure. I thought this was the “real 
stuff” of law school. Most of my law professors were dazzling 
practitioners of Socratic method. I was almost as thrilled by their 
erudition and agile wit as I was terrified that they would glance up 
from their seating charts and call out my name. I still keep their 
pictures on my refrigerator. 
That same year, I had “skills training” in Legal Research and 
Writing. I remember Legal Research and Writing as a necessary 
                                                                                                                 
 6. Peggy Cooper Davis, Slay the Three-Headed Demon, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 619, 623–24 
(2008) (arguing that relational aspects of practical and ethical work lead us to associate the work with 
femininity and subordination and therefore to disparage it). 
 7. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Taking Law and _____ Really Seriously: Before, During and after “The 
Law,” 60 VAND. L. REV. 555, 561–64; see also Edward Rubin, What’s Wrong with Langdell’s Method, 
and What to Do About It, 60 VAND. L. REV. 609, 631–35 (arguing that Langdell viewed law as a fixed 
system, like a pre-Kuhnian natural science).  
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nuisance taught by bored third (or maybe second) year students. This 
program ended with a mandatory Moot Court competition. I 
remember Moot Court as a marginalized but mysteriously satisfying 
experience that convinced me of the necessity of developing research 
and writing skills but seemed oddly incomplete.  
I went to law school before Watergate and the obligatory course in 
professional responsibility,8 so attention to ethical issues was a hit or 
miss thing. I do recall that the Dean sometimes cautioned during 1L 
orientation that we should “never, never commingle our funds and 
our clients’ funds,” but I don’t recall much more in the way of an 
ethical apprenticeship.9  
Entering the world of practice, I felt spottily prepared. I enjoyed 
analyzing and synthesizing cases, and I thought I did it pretty well, 
but I did it in a strangely isolated way. I imagined that my 
interpretations of case law were objective and insightful. I had never 
really thought about being an advocate or giving counsel. About the 
difficulty of interpreting law in a way that was both responsible and 
true to my client’s interests: I thought I wrote pretty clearly, but I 
hadn’t thought about what it takes to write persuasively. I gave little 
conscious thought to the effect my professional communications 
would have on others. I had never thought about how to resolve a 
dispute without litigation. Over ten years of practice I was awakened 
to the interactive and creative dimensions of lawyering, but law 
school had nothing to do with it.  
I then became a lower court judge. It was fascinating to see things 
from the other side of the bench, but law school and practice had only 
partially prepared me for the complicated process of interpreting 
rules under always new and often pressing circumstances.  
After three years on the bench, I joined the NYU Law School 
faculty. There, under the tutelage of mentors at least as dazzling as 
                                                                                                                 
 8. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS 302(a)(5) (2009–
2010) (requiring “substantial” instruction in professional responsibility); Deborah Rhode, Ethics by the 
Pervasive Method, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 31, 39 (1992) (reporting history of the ABA professional 
responsibility requirement). 
 9. I also took a lecture course in The Development of Legal Institutions (not-so-fondly known as 
DLI). I dimly remember DLI as a quick and dirty, although sometimes useful, study of English legal 
history. 
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my 1965 Socratic interlocutors, I have repeatedly revisited the 
disparate parts of the traditional legal education I received all those 
years ago. In the process, I have come to understand why I was so 
confused in law school and why I was so spottily prepared to lawyer 
or to judge. In the process I also stumbled on the fascinatingly related 
history of Langdell’s derailed initiative in legal education.   
I.  THE LANGDELLIAN REVOLUTION 
Thanks in large part to the work of Anthony Chase10 and Bruce 
Kimball,11 we now know that what we call Socratic or Langdellian 
teaching was not so much a retreat to formalism as it was an escape 
from learning by passive absorption of conclusions about the law to a 
regime of learning by original study and critique of judicial 
decisions.12  
Chase’s work points to the connection between Langdell’s 
reformation of the law school curriculum and Charles Eliot’s study of 
European learning theory. Eliot was president of Harvard University 
from 1869 to 1909, and in 1870, he appointed his friend, Christopher 
Columbus Langdell, as dean of the Harvard Law School. Legal 
education had recently migrated from law offices with apprenticeship 
arrangements to university campuses. Indeed, before he attended 
Harvard Law School, Langdell had completed an internship at a New 
York law firm that would have qualified him in most states for 
admission to the bar.13 At Harvard, and presumably at other 
university-based law schools, legal education was initially a rather 
informal affair, with no required courses, no examinations and no 
pedagogy beyond the recommendation of treatises and the 
                                                                                                                 
 10. Anthony Chase, The Birth of the Modern Law School, 23 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 329 (1979). 
 11. See BRUCE A. KIMBALL, THE INCEPTION OF MODERN PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION: C.C. 
LANGDELL, 1826–1906 (2009). 
 12. Id. at 145 (quoting one of the first students of Langdell’s case method as reporting, “The result of 
the method of Langdell was active search and inquiry; that of the other professors was passive 
absorption”). 
 13. Id. at 31.  
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presentation of lectures in which bodies of law were summarized, 
often by treatise authors who simply read their treatises.14  
Eliot, who was heavily influenced by Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi’s 
pioneering work in education, must have found the law school 
curriculum entirely unsatisfactory. The Pestalozzi Method was a 
precursor of the “progressive” school of education championed in the 
United States by Francis Parker and John Dewey (indeed, after his 
tenure at Harvard, Eliot worked with Dewey at Columbia 
University). The method was grounded in the belief that the “aim of   
. . . teaching was to develop the children’s own powers and faculties 
rather than to impart facts; to show not so much what [but] how to 
learn.”15 An early opponent of corporal punishment, Pestalozzi 
argued that it was wrong either to strike children or to force-feed 
them information.16 Children should be lovingly supervised as they 
followed their own curiosity through carefully selected activities.17 
They should learn things by experiencing them.18 They would then 
find or be given language for the things they had learned and solidify 
their knowledge as they repeated the process in increasingly 
challenging activities.19  
Eliot was also influenced by the work of Friedrich Froebel, 
Edward Seguin, and Maria Montessori. Froebel, who studied with 
Pestalozzi, coined the term “kindergarten,” to express his view that 
the child’s inherent curiosity and drive to activity should be 
cultivated as one would cultivate a garden.20 He credited Pestalozzi 
for developing learning methods that respected the dignity of each 
                                                                                                                 
 14. Id. at 34 (explaining that until the late 1860s, teaching at Harvard Law School was considered 
“perfunctory” because it employed “‘the old methods’ of lecture and recitation”). 
 15. Chase, supra note 10, at 343. 




 17. See JOHANN HEINRICH PESTALOZZI, HOW GERTRUDE TEACHES HER CHILDREN 165 (Lucy E. 
Holland & Frances C. Turner trans., Ebenezer Cooke ed., C.W. Bardeen 1898) (1801). 
 18. Id. at 165–66. 
 19. For an extensive review of Pestalozzi’s Method, see Pestalozzi’s World, Educating Children for 
a Better Life, http://pestalozziworld.com/pestalozzi/methods.html. 
 20. FRIEDRICH FROEBEL, FROEBEL’S CHIEF WRITINGS ON EDUCATION 237 (Samuel Sigmund 
Fechheimer Fletcher & James Welton trans., J.W. Adamson ed., 1912). 
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individual child.21 Froebel designed games or “gifts” with which a 
child could gain knowledge and skill in acts of play.22 Writing of 
these games, he said that they “not only nourish the inner activity 
drive, but they also teach the use of the child’s immediate 
environment as a means for play and occupation and as educational 
aids.”23 He added that the games were educational as well for the 
adults who supervised children’s play and that they were contexts for 
healthy and mutually instructive bonding.24 Seguin worked 
principally with developmentally disabled children.25 He believed 
that physiological impairment complicated and slowed a 
developmentally disabled child’s process of learning as the child was 
led by curiosity to experience and name things.26 The solution was to 
have an adult lead the child through activities, directing and assisting 
to a greater extent than would be necessary with other children.27 In 
the beginning of her career, Maria Montessori also worked with 
developmentally disabled children, but she extended her insights and 
those of Froebel and Seguin to develop learning tools for all 
students.28 Expanding on the work of Froebel and Seguin, she created 
environments in which children of different ages could learn 
collaboratively as they shared and discussed experiences.29 
Eliot consistently sought to implement these experiential methods 
at Harvard.30 Before he became president of the university, he 
revolutionized the Harvard chemistry department by having students 
conduct laboratory experiments rather than listen to lectures.31 We 
                                                                                                                 
 21. Id. at 19. 
 22. Id. at 21–22. 
 23. JOACHIM LIEBSCHNER, A CHILD’S WORK: FREEDOM AND PLAY IN FROEBEL’S EDUCATIONAL 
THEORY AND PRACTICE 82 (The Lutterworth Press 1992) (2001). 
 24. FROEBEL, supra note 20, at 101. 
 25. JAMES W. TRENT, JR., INVENTING THE FEEBLE MIND: A HISTORY OF MENTAL RETARDATION IN 
THE UNITED STATES 40 (1994). 
 26. Id. at 48. 
 27. Edouard Seguin, Origin of the Treatment and Training of Idiots, in IDIOTS AND THE EFFORTS 
FOR THEIR IMPROVEMENT 24–25 (L.P. Brockett ed., Hartford, Case, Tiffany & Co. 1856). 
 28. See generally MARIA MONTESSORI, THE MONTESSORI METHOD (Anne E. George trans., 1912). 
 29. Association Montessori Internationale (AMI), Montessori Approach, http://www.montessori-
ami.org/ (last visited Dec. 5, 2009). 
 30. Chase, supra note 10, at 343. 
 31. Id. at 334. 
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can imagine the laboratory experiment as a Froebilian “gift” that puts 
the chemistry student in an educational state of play. He then 
designed and taught laboratory sciences at M.I.T. In 1896, Eliot 
published a description of his teaching methods in a two-part article, 
The New Education: Its Organization. There, Eliot rejected the 
lecture method and learning by rote memorization in favor of 
collaborative student-teacher interactions in which students learned 
by reasoning inductively. He also advocated more rigorous 
admissions policies and degree requirements for graduate study.32   
Although Langdell is not known to have had independent 
knowledge of education theory, his views about pedagogy resonated 
with those of Eliot, his president and long time friend.33 As Eliot had 
recommended for all graduate and professional schools, Langdell 
tightened admissions criteria at the law school.34 He also introduced 
examinations and a required set of courses. But Langdell’s best 
remembered innovation was legal study by the ‘case method.’ 
Harvard law students would no longer spend their time reading 
treatises or sitting passively as treatises were summarized or read to 
them. As Eliot was insisting that people learn better as active 
problem-solvers than as passive receptacles of information, Langdell 
set about to make active problem-solvers of law students. He 
gathered and distributed to his students sets of judicial opinions that 
had been issued in related cases, assigning a sub-set to be read in 
preparation for each class. And he transformed his classes from a 
lecture format to the format that came to be known as Socratic 
method. No longer did students sit and listen while a lecturer droned 
on; they became active players in the classroom drama. The 
Centennial History of the Harvard Law School describes in this way 
the first few minutes of the first meeting of Langdell's new kind of 
class:  
                                                                                                                 
 32. Id. at 334–36. 
 33. For an account of the Langdell-Elliot relationship, begun when they were both Harvard 
undergraduates, see KIMBALL, supra note 11, at 37–39. 
 34. Chase, supra note 10, at 332. 
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Langdell: “Mr. Fox, will you state the facts in the case of Payne 
v. Cave?” 
Mr. Fox did his best with the facts of the case. 
Langdell: “Mr. Rawle, will you give the plaintiff’s argument?” 
Mr. Rawle gave what he could of the plaintiff’s argument. 
Langdell: “Mr. Adams do you agree with that?” 
In his well documented biography of Langdell, Bruce Kimball has 
given us more extended recreations of the discourse in Langdell’s 
classes by piecing together notes from Langdell’s papers, annotations 
by Langdell and by his students in the margins of casebooks, and 
other sources.35 All of these reconstructed texts reveal a climate of 
active learning. 
Rather than take the judicial opinion as received wisdom, 
Langdell’s students were asked to replicate, or improve on, the 
judge’s reasoning and the arguments of the lawyers on each side who 
framed and guided the judge’s thinking. Students were asked to 
imagine and understand the context in which judicial decision-
making occurs and to recreate the dynamic within which a decision is 
reached. Within the constraints of precedent and stare decisis, what 
arguments might have been made responsibly on each side? How 
might they have been received? How might they have been 
answered? These were questions to be pondered and debated rather 
than pronouncements to be received. They replicated problems and 
tasks of practice. They required students to perform rather than 
simply to absorb. They made the classroom a dialogic experience in 
which experts and novices developed knowledge as they worked 
discursively to solve problems. As Kimball also shows, Langdell’s 
examinations took a similar form: he gave students the Froebelian 
gifts of hypotheticals to puzzle over in light of what they understood 
to be established law.36 
In all these respects, the Langdellian system embodied the 
educational theories that were pioneered by Pestalozzi, developed in 
                                                                                                                 
 35. KIMBALL, supra note 11, at 147–48. 
 36. Id. at 160–64. 
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elementary and remedial education by Froebel, Seguin and 
Montessori,37 and embraced by Eliot in the university context. Eliot 
approvingly described Langdell’s innovations in a 1920 essay in the 
Harvard Law Review: 
Professor Langdell had, I think, no acquaintance with the 
educational theories or practices of Froebel, Pestalozzi, Seguin, 
and Montessori; yet his method of teaching was a direct 
application to intelligent and well-trained adults of some of their 
methods for children and defectives. He tried to make his 
students use their own minds logically on given facts, and then to 
state their reasoning and conclusions directly in the classroom. 
He led them to exact reasoning and exposition by first setting an 
example himself, and then giving them abundant opportunities 
for putting their own minds into vigorous action, in order, first, 
that they might gain mental power, and secondly, that they might 
hold firmly the information or knowledge they had acquired. It 
was a strong case of education by drawing out from each 
individual student mental activity of a very strenuous and 
informing kind. The elementary and secondary schools of the 
United States are only just beginning to adopt on a large scale 
this method of education, a method which is not passive but 
intensely active, not mainly an absorption from either book or 
teacher but primarily a constant giving-forth.38 
The initial response to Langdell’s method was anxious and critical. 
Students were uncomfortable with expressing their necessarily novice 
opinions in a public setting.39 They complained that they weren’t 
learning as they had in lectures. They even suggested that Langdell 
gave up lecturing because he didn’t know anything and hence had 
                                                                                                                 
 37. DENIS LAWTON & PETER GORDON, A HISTORY OF WESTERN EDUCATIONAL IDEAS 204–07 
(2002); Museum of disABILITY History, Biography of Edward Seguin (1812–1880), 
http://www.museumofdisability.org/education_educators.asp. 
 38. Charles Eliot, Langdell and the Law School, 33 HARV. L. REV. 518 (1920) (emphasis supplied). 
 39. KIMBALL, supra note 11, at 144–45. 
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nothing to say. Soon only seven or eight students were attending his 
class.40   
Langdell was able to remake legal education only because he 
persisted despite three consecutive years of declining enrollments. He 
was convinced that memorization of material gleaned from lectures 
and treatises is less valuable to law students than learning to analyze 
and reason from law’s primary sources. And in time enrollment 
picked up. Graduates of Langdell’s program proved themselves 
well-prepared for practice and were able to get good jobs.41 Within 
little more than forty years, Langdell’s case method was vindicated. 
When in 1914, the Carnegie Foundation commissioned its first report 
on legal education in the United States, the author, Josef Redlich, 
pronounced the Socratic method a success.42 Law schools were 
settled, for what will surely be at least a century, into a dialogic 
method for training novice practitioners. 
On this account, we can understand the Socratic method as the first 
of several moves toward giving law students the chance to learn in 
the way psychologists increasingly say that both children and adults 
learn best: by working collaboratively and at the growing edge of 
their abilities—at times sharing and applying collaborators’ 
knowledge and methods, at other times gaining new knowledge and 
developing new methods.43 A student came to the Langdellian 
classroom with knowledge of a set of cases and preliminary 
interpretations of those cases. In the classroom, the student was 
engaged in dialogue to test competing interpretations and perhaps 
come to new interpretations.  
The next step from this kind of experiential, student-centered and 
collaborative learning might reasonably have been progression to 
simulation and clinical courses in which students could be still more 
                                                                                                                 
 40. Id.; see also HARVARD CENTENNIAL, supra note 1, at 35.  
 41. See KIMBALL, supra note 11, at 140–46; Chase, supra note 10, at 338–39. 
 42. JOSEF REDLICH, COMMON LAW AND THE CASE METHOD IN AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW 
SCHOOLS: A REPORT TO THE CARNEGIE FOUNDATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING (1914). 
 43. For fuller explanations of this kind of experiential, collaborative learning, see ROLAND G. THARP 
& RONALD GALLIMORE, ROUSING MINDS TO LIFE: TEACHING, LEARNING AND SCHOOLING IN SOCIAL 
CONTEXT 31 (1988); 1 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF L.S. VYGOTSKY 212 (Robert W. Reiber & Aaron S. 
Carton eds., 1987); L.S. VYGOTSKY, MIND AND SOCIETY 86 (1978). 
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active and independent. As we will see, however, the relationship 
between Langdellian teaching and simulation or clinical teaching 
came to be understood much differently.  
II.  THE DERAILMENT 
Despite widespread acceptance of the Langdellian method, student 
anxiety did not entirely abate. Students wondered—and wonder to 
this day—what exactly they are meant to learn in a Langdellian 
classroom. Does the dialogic dance lead invariably to identification 
of a right answer? If so, why doesn’t someone figure out the right 
answers and write them down? If not, what are law students supposed 
to learn? The appetite for answers and for certainty distracts students 
from the process of developing judgment as they turn to hornbooks 
and return to rote learning. The first Carnegie Report echoed this 
sentiment. Redlich tempered his praise of Langdellian method with 
an insistence on the importance of supplementing Socratic discourse 
with introductory lectures; a forum for having questions answered; 
and textbooks, dictionaries and encyclopedias. Socratic back and 
forth was fine, but at the end of the day there had to be a place to go 
to for “right answers.” 
Ironically, the complaint that Langdellian method provides no 
“right answers” was soon to be turned on its head: Along came the 
Legal Realists with the news that legal questions often do not have 
single and verifiable “right answers.” Legal Realists observed that 
lawyers and judges are regularly faced with situations for which there 
is no precedent and to which the texts of statutes and prior judicial 
decisions do not speak definitively. The corollary was that scholars, 
lawyers and judges should stop searching for fixed answers to legal 
questions and begin to find principled ways of working with an 
inevitable indeterminacy. Thinking about law, lawyering and judging 
should extend beyond the four corners of authoritative legal texts 
(principally judicial opinions and legislative or administrative 
enactments) to examine how the answers to legal questions are 
constructed, interpreted and argued. Realists might have adopted a 
friendly attitude toward Langdellian discourse, seeing it as going 
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beyond judicial opinions to wrestle with the underlying arguments 
from which those opinions emerged. Unfortunately, two things 
conspired against a harmonious relationship between Langdellians 
and Realists: Langdell’s belief in an “academic elite” and his 
suggestion that law is analogous to “science.”  
Langdell did believe, in a certain sense, that law students should be 
taught by an “academic elite.” As Langdell himself put it, “a 
candidate for professorship in the law school . . . is required as a sine 
qua non to distinguish himself in the Law School . . . [by] being one 
of the very first men in his class.”44 Despite his own fifteen years of 
practice experience, Langdell saw academic distinction not only as a 
necessary requirement for the professoriate of a law school, but as a 
sufficient one: “What qualifies a person . . . to teach law is not 
experience in the work of a lawyer’s office, not experience in dealing 
with men, not experience in the trial or argument of causes—not 
experience, in short, in using the law, but experience in learning the 
law.”45 Kimball documents Langdell’s disgust with what he saw as 
corruption among practitioners46 and concludes that “Langdell 
proceeded to the extreme heresy that accomplishment in legal 
practice . . . may in fact be detrimental. He believed that purity of 
academic merit was required of those who profess the law.”47 It is no 
surprise, then, that practice-grounded Legal Realists did not embrace 
Langdell’s method or see it as a path to understanding the 
constructedness of law. 
Langdell’s disdain for the world of practice combined with his 
(and Eliot’s) embrace of a laboratory or “scientific” approach to 
learning to suggest absolutism. In the Realists’ view, Langdellian 
method was not just blind to the complexities of practice; its star-
gazing bookishness fostered the illusion that legal problems could be 
solved by cloistered study rather than worked out in the trenches of 
                                                                                                                 
 44. KIMBALL, supra note 11, at 169 (quoting a letter from Langdell to Elliot, dated November 22, 
1897). 
 45. Id. (quoting Christopher C. Langell, Address, in REPORT OF THE NINTH ANNUAL MEETING AT 
CAMBRIDGE, JUNE 25, 1985 41, 48 (Harvard Law School Association, 1895)) (emphasis supplied). 
 46. Id. at 69–77. 
 47. Id. at 169. 
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practice and judging. This illusion of determinacy unsettled an earlier 
and more nuanced jurisprudential model.  
Prominent Realists found a model for principled work in an 
uncertain legal world in what Roscoe Pound described as the early or 
grand period in American law and in what Karl Llewellyn described 
as the grand or classic period.48 These scholars argued that before the 
late nineteenth century, judicial decision-making was disciplined by 
the authoritative texts of precedent and enacted rules, but at the same 
time overtly a matter of exercising judgment rather than a matter of 
divining a preordained “right” answer. The claim was that there had 
been a shift in legal thought in the United States. In the formative, 
early years of American common law, judges appreciated, and 
litigators played to, the need to combine respect for precedent with 
what Llewellyn called “situation-sense,” an expert’s educated feel for 
how to apply and shape the law so that it is true to its perceived 
functions and to a shared sense of justice.49 But in later years, the 
emphasis in teaching law “tended ever more strongly away from how 
. . . successive courts had used the slowly changing or expanding 
body of precedent; it shifted rather to the unfolding and uncovering 
of some ‘true’ principle assumed to have been in the law all along.”50 
What the Realists perceived as a shift to the uncovering of “true” 
principles was coincident with the rise of the Langdellian casebook 
and teaching method. More sober Realists declined to assume as a 
result that Langdellianism had caused the law’s newfound 
commitment to absolutism or “true” principles.51 Other Realists, no 
doubt influenced by Langdell’s well known disdain for practitioners, 
assumed that Langdellianism was equivalent to rigid formalism. This 
is rather crudely revealed in an influential article by Realist Jerome 
Frank. Unlike most Realists, Frank had occasion to set out in detail 
his views about the law school curriculum. In or shortly before 1932 
he was asked by the Alumni Advisory Board of the University of 
                                                                                                                 
 48. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 35–36 (1960). 
 49. Id. at 212–57.   
 50. Id. at 120. 
 51. Id. (describing as ironic the fact that the case book method did not highlight indeterminacy); id. 
at 360 (criticizing Jerome Frank for making inaccurate charges against Langdell). 
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Chicago’s law school to draft a proposal for curricular change. 
Frank’s report was not only submitted to the Alumni Advisory Board, 
but also published as a law review article and widely discussed, if not 
widely heeded, throughout legal academia.52  
The report began with a factually inaccurate and oddly personal 
assault on Langdell and his Socratic methods. Although Langdell was 
an experienced and successful practitioner, Frank described him as an 
almost pathologically reclusive man who was largely ignorant about 
the practice of law and similarly ignorant about, and inept at, human 
interaction. According to Frank, “the so-called case system . . . was 
the expression of the strange character of a cloistered, retiring 
bookish man,” and it was “[d]ue to Langell’s idiosyncracies” that law 
school came to be focused almost exclusively on books.  
Llewellyn had suggested that the case method’s examination of a 
line of cases was well-suited to demonstrating indeterminacy, for it 
exposed “how . . . successive courts had used [a] . . . slowly changing 
or expanding body of precedent.” Frank disagreed. He argued that 
students who learned about law and lawyering from appellate 
opinions were “like future horticulturists confining their studies to cut 
flowers,”53 blind to the roots and the developmental life of the legal 
matters they needed to understand.  The Langdellian method was not 
a case method at all, Frank argued, for appellate opinions were not 
cases, but post facto rationalizations of decisions at the conclusion of 
cases. To understand a case, students needed to study “the complete 
records . . . beginning with the filing of the first papers, through the 
trial in the trial court and to and through the upper courts” and to 
observe actual court proceedings. But studying case records and 
observing trials was not enough. Echoing the views of other practice-
grounded commentators, Frank argued that law students needed 
clinical experiences that would replicate the best features of the 
apprenticeship model. They needed to work under the supervision of 
faculty who were expert practitioners on the litigation of actual cases.  
                                                                                                                 
 52. Jerome Frank, Why Not a Clinical Lawyer School?, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 907 (1933). 
 53. Id. at 912.  
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In Frank’s view, students also needed classroom study, but that 
study needed to be either interdisciplinary or quick and dirty. 
Consistent with the Realist belief in a “sociological jurisprudence,”54 
Frank advocated instruction of law students by social scientists who 
could educate them to “the inter-relation between law and the 
phenomena of daily living,” and by logicians and psychologists who 
could broaden and deepen their understanding of legal reasoning. 
And in what sounded oddly like an appeal for the return of rote 
learning, Frank proposed that legal concepts be more 
straightforwardly set out in text books and lectures; indeed, like 
perplexed law students and like the author of the first Carnegie 
Report, he seemed to favor a return to the treatise and lecture format 
that characterized the curriculum Langdell had replaced. Frank 
proposed more straightforward teaching of legal concepts because he 
thought it would be more efficient, leaving ample time for the 
learning that, in Frank’s view, really mattered: interdisciplinary study 
and training on the apprenticeship model. In Frank’s terms, law 
students needed a “clinical lawyer-school” run by a healthy mix of 
scholars and scholarly practitioners, rather than a Langdellian “law-
teacher school” run by and for the professional professoriate Langdell 
(and Eliot) had created. 55 
Llewellyn’s and Frank’s different assessments of Langdell’s 
method reveal the underlying logic of the case method as well as its 
lingering mythology. As Llewellyn saw, the case method was 
perfectly suited to training students to understand how rules evolve as 
lawyers argue the implications of purported instantiations.56 But in 
the end Langdellian classes came to be widely thought of as detached 
(pseudo)scientific quests for absolute “truth,”57 and giants like Oliver 
                                                                                                                 
 54. LAW AND SOCIAL ACTION: SELECTED ESSAYS OF ALEXANDER H. PEKELIS 1–41 (Milton Konvitz 
ed., 1950). 
 55. Frank, supra note 52, at 918–20. 
 56. Even Frank seemed to recognize the case method’s promise. He wrote: “noting . . . [Langdell’s] 
plea for induction, his efforts to avoid the glib generalities of casebooks, one cannot help feeling that he 
was seeking obliquely and fumblingly to return to some extent to courtroom actualities.” Id. at 909–10.  
 57. For more explanatory accounts of this perception, see ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL 
EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO THE 1980S (1985) 54–55 (describing an association 
between the “virility” of active learning and late nineteenth century notions of the scientific); LAURA 
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Wendell Holmes accused Langdell of naively treating law as a 
system of a priori rules.58 
III.  GETTING BACK ON TRACK 
A.   Sniffing Out False Dichotomies 
Frank advocated a multifaceted lawyer-school rather than 
Langdellian case method teaching. The problem lies in the “rather 
than.” This unfortunate dichotomization badly distorts the function of 
Langdell’s case method for at least two reasons. First, as we have 
seen, the case method was not designed to make law students 
reclusively cerebral. It was designed to enliven their learning by 
making it experiential rather than simply receptive. It was a move 
from treating law students as passive recipients of settled knowledge 
to making them active interpreters of arguably settled rules in the 
context of new relationships and circumstances. This is the lawyer’s 
art. S/he is not simply someone who knows things or knows how to 
look things up; s/he is most importantly someone who can 
purposefully and responsibly interpret the law in order to advocate, to 
counsel, to structure relationships, or to exercise judgment. The law 
student’s hunger for basic knowledge is, of course, not a bad thing. 
Nor were Frank and the first Carnegie Report wrong to worry that 
Langdellian method might slow and complicate the acquisition of 
basic knowledge. Every law student should get to know a set of 
classic legal texts and basic legal principles, and this body of 
knowledge is so vast and ever-changing that some shortcuts to 
learning are required. It is impractical to try to teach everything 
through Froebelian play. There will always be a tension between 
resources and efficiency on the one hand and educational richness on 
the other. But the work of interpretation, advocacy and judgment that 
goes on in a thoughtfully run Langdellian classroom is central to 
                                                                                                                 
KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE 13 (1986) (describing associations between the case method and 
late nineteenth century Darwinism, positivism and passion for science). 
 58. KIMBALL, supra note 11, at 109 (quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes, Book Review, 14 AM. L. REV. 
233 (1880) (reviewing C.C. LANGDELL, A SUMMARY OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1879)).  
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every aspect of practice, and it makes perfect sense to practice these 
skills in classroom dialogue and in simulations.  
The second problem with the Realist critique of Langdellian 
education is that the case method does not, as many Realists charged, 
presume scientistic absolutism. Some of Langdell’s statements about 
the nature of law do suggest that he was attempting to lead his 
students to knowledge that was fixed, unchanging and knowable. In 
the oft-quoted introduction to his casebook on the law of contracts, he 
wrote:  
Law, considered as a science, consists of certain principles or 
doctrines. To have such a mastery of these as to be able to apply 
them with constant facility and certainty to the ever-tangled 
skein of human affairs, is what constitutes a true lawyer; and 
hence to acquire that mastery should be the business of every 
earnest student of law.59  
It makes sense, then, to imagine that after Langdell prompted Mr. 
Fox to state the case of Payne v. Cove, and prompted Mr. Rawle to 
give the plaintiff’s argument, and invited Mr. Adams to agree or 
disagree, he asked Mr. Rawle a series of challenging questions that 
led to the conclusion that his argument for the plaintiff was wrong. 
And it could be that Langdell then led Mr. Adams through a review 
of precedent to the “a-ha!” moment of seeing the correct result, and 
hence making a judgment supporting the court if the case was rightly 
decided and faulting the court if it was not.  
But this would be an oversimplification. Having reviewed 
Langdell’s “published works, his letters, and about ten thousand 
pages of loose or bound manuscripts,”60 Kimball found only three 
references to law as a natural science. Taking Langdell’s work as a 
whole, Kimball concludes that these three references were 
“anomalous.”61 Kimball also explains that Langdell’s undergraduate 
                                                                                                                 
 59. CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS LANGDELL, CASES ON CONTRACTS, at vi (1871). 
 60. KIMBALL, supra note 11, at 350. 
 61. Id. 
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training in the natural sciences took account of the fact that a purely 
inductive process cannot logically lead to a closed and formal 
system62 and demonstrates that Langdell’s scholarship, like that of 
Holmes, addressed the complex and contradictory interplay of a 
formalistic deference to authority and an indeterminacy that allows 
the law to respond to notions of justice and efficiency.63 The evidence 
now available should cause us to recognize that Langdell was a 
sophisticated scholar who realized that, science or not, law poses hard 
questions that can’t be, or at least haven’t been, resolved with 
certainty.64  
This sophistication was also reflected in Langdell’s teaching. 
Kimball’s recreations of two of Langdell’s classes support the 
conclusion that Langdell cared more about what and how his students 
thought than about whether they knew right answers. Langdell 
pushed his students beyond simple answers, consistently demanding 
reasons and arguments.65 It may be, then, that he challenged Rawle 
and Adams mercilessly until they were disabused of any naive 
certainty about the correct result and ready to join their Socrates in a 
mutual quest for the truth of the matter. And it may even be that 
Langdell went beyond Socratic examination to mutual inquiry, 
devoting at least some of his class sessions to what education 
theorists (borrowing from philosophers of language) would call 
genuine questions—questions about which the questioner is actually 
curious. Perhaps when Langdell asked Mr. Adams what he thought of 
the plaintiff’s arguments he meant not to set a trap but actually to 
discover and discuss what Mr. Adams thought. Certainly, many 
current Socratic teachers have that motivation. 
One can use the case method and be for, against, or agnostic about 
the mysterious and wonderful questions of when law and lawyering 
are merely practical and when they become experimental and 
                                                                                                                 
 62. Id. at 24–27. 
 63. Id. at 108–29. 
 64. But see Rubin, supra note 7, at 631–35 (arguing that Langdell’s thought was insufficiently 
advanced to have encompassed a notion of uncertainty). 
 65. KIMBALL, supra note 11, at 147–60. 
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whether they are always in some way experimental.66 Even in the so-
called hard sciences, work is sometimes practical (as in testing a 
sample of blood for known viruses); sometimes experimental (as in 
identifying a new virus) and sometimes both (as in identifying a new 
virus in the course of treating a patient). Learning by doing makes 
sense for the biochemist whether he expects to experiment or to apply 
fixed principles. By the same token, learning by doing makes sense in 
the law whether we believe that judging and lawyering are always 
practical, sometimes practical and sometimes experimental, or always 
experimental.  
B.   Framing a Desegregation Plan 
I did not offer my story of derailment to suggest that legal realism 
all by itself distorted or destroyed the Langdellian revolution. There 
are lots of alternative stories. We could imagine the apprenticeship 
model steadily perfecting itself and then getting derailed when legal 
education was handed over to universities. Within the university 
setting, we could imagine a growing clinical movement getting 
derailed by academics who wanted legal education to seem more 
scholarly and scientific. We could imagine a movement toward 
clinical education in public interest settings being derailed by the 
reality that law schools train both public interest and private sector 
lawyers and the belief that different skill sets are required to serve the 
rich than to serve the poor. We could imagine that traditionalists 
derail or limit clinical education on the theory that public interest 
practitioners are incapable of objectivity and intellectual rigor but are 
ideologically biased and excel at story-telling. Or we could turn the 
tables again to argue that clinical scholars have undermined 
Langdellian teaching by telling students that those who know do and 
those who don’t know teach. Each of these stories has a grain of 
truth, but each misinterprets and oversimplifies, and each has a 
generous sprinkling of unwarranted blame. 
                                                                                                                 
 66. See Peggy Cooper Davis & Elizabeth Ehrenfest-Steinfeld, A Dialogue About Socratic Teaching, 
23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 249 (1997) (demonstrating that Socratic method can (and should) be 
used consistently with an appreciation of indeterminacy). 
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These kinds of oversimplification, misinterpretation and blame are 
the result of factionalization. Clinical and other experiential teachers 
and scholars do not communicate extensively or effectively with so-
called academic teachers and scholars. Why should this be so? We 
can find an answer in Claude Steele’s brilliant extension of the 
already profound theory of “stereotype threat.” Steele and various co-
authors initially used laboratory experiments to show that anxiety 
about confirming a negative stereotype impedes performance by 
those who are subject to stereotyped thinking.67 Thus, an older person 
might suffer a memory lapse because—or in part because—s/he 
knows that older people are generally thought to be forgetful. Or a 
woman might suffer disabling math anxiety because she knows that 
women are thought to be less adept than men in mathematics. Newer 
research by Steele and colleagues shows that anxiety is similarly 
aroused among those who fear confirming that they hold negative 
stereotypes.68 Thus, a younger person may fear conveying the 
expectation that an older person will be forgetful. Or a man may fear 
conveying the expectation that women will be less able in 
mathematics. Steele and his colleagues have shown that both of these 
forms of anxiety lead to distancing and disengagement.69 Put simply, 
when we have reason to fear a negative judgment, we flee in order to 
avoid being judged. The result, of course, is mutual ignorance and 
deepening misunderstanding.  
What’s needed is some Barackian courage and tolerance. As our 
President would say, we can not achieve tolerance unless we confront 
the differences and misunderstandings that have kept us apart. In the 
spirit of correcting misunderstandings and achieving the tolerance 
that educational reform will require, I propose a friendly amendment 
to the Carnegie Report. Instead of calling for integration, let’s call for 
desegregation.   
                                                                                                                 
 67. See, e.g., Claude M. Steele, A Threat in the Air: How Stereotypes Shape Intellectual Identity and 
Performance, 52 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 613, 613 (1997). 
 68. Philip Atiba Goff, Claude M. Steele & Paul G. Davies, The Space Between Us: Stereotype 
Threat and Distance in Interracial Contexts, 94 J. OF PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 91, 105 (2008). 
 69. Id. 
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The advantage of the term “desegregation” is that it reminds us 
that we need to undo something. We don’t just need to put the three 
apprenticeships together; we need to undo the effects of their 
segregation by resolving the misunderstandings that caused us to 
keep them apart.  
It isn’t hard to find common ground for Legal Realists and 
proponents of progressive education reform. Surely Frank was right, 
and in harmony with Charles Eliot’s vision of education, when he 
argued that some of professional training should occur in clinical 
settings. We are in increasing agreement that Frank was also right 
about the need to make professional education broadly 
multidisciplinary. Whether or not we believe that the answers to legal 
questions are ultimately indeterminate, there is a consensus that their 
resolution is usefully informed by social scientific knowledge and by 
knowledge about individual and collective decision-making. A 
hundred years of work in the fields of psychology and education 
support the learning theory that underlies Eliot-Langdellian teaching 
methods. Indeed, the reasoning behind these methods has been 
embraced by clinical teachers and scholars even as it has gone 
ignored by most teachers and scholars whom we might classify as 
Langdellian. 
Thinking in these more harmonious terms, law schools are 
beginning to achieve the kind of meaningful integration that the 
Carnegie critique requires. We continue to learn at every turn, but I 
think we’re getting some things right.  
First, law professors across the country increasingly understand 
Langdellian teaching as an experiential enterprise. Langdellian 
teachers continue to put—and to make a point of putting—students in 
role. We ask our students to do cognitive work toward hypothetical 
but practical ends, and we challenge them to do it responsibly. We 
have also developed new teaching methods that build on experiential 
learning theory. The problem method casebook is a prominent and 
increasingly popular example. I recently polled my clinical and 
academic colleagues to ask how many of them required students to 
answer questions or do assignments in role, used or had written 
problem-method casebooks or had developed simulations for their 
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courses. Only one of the 31 colleagues who responded had done none 
of these things; all but two reported that they questioned students in 
role or had them do assignments in role.70  
As an example, for more than twenty-five years, we at NYU have 
worked to achieve what the great practitioner-scholar-clinician 
Anthony Amsterdam envisioned when he created our Lawyering 
program: to assure that over the three years of legal study every 
student has the opportunity to learn in increasingly realistic and 
active professional contexts. 
 All of our first year students are enrolled in a year-long 
simulation course (Lawyering) in which they do 
increasingly complex exercises in legal interpretation, 
legal research, fact development, interviewing, 
counseling, written and oral advocacy and prescriptive 
drafting. Our central goals are to deepen students’ 
understanding of legal principles by giving them the 
opportunity to put those principles to use and to teach 
them to be reflective and self-critical in every 
dimension of practice. Members of the Lawyering 
faculty are experienced, reflective and scholarly 
practitioners who work in each simulation to guide 
students in defining their professional roles and 
responsibilities and developing the full range of skills 
necessary to professional excellence. We stress the 
relationships between the work students do in 
Lawyering and the work they do in their Langdellian 
courses, and we stress the need for intellectual 
versatility and context-sensitivity in every dimension of 
practice.  
 We have developed a still small but sophisticated set of 
upper level simulation courses in which students can 
continue to deepen their understanding of law by using 
                                                                                                                 
 70. Survey results on file with author. 
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it and continue to focus sharply on the development of 
professional skill.  
 We are expanding our clinical program to assure that 
clinical experience is available in a full range of 
substantive practice areas. Our clinics are not designed 
to be enclaves for those disaffected from Langdellian 
teaching. They are designed to cap a carefully 
conceived series of experiential learning experiences, 
each of which is related explicitly to professional 
development. 
The desegregation process is not proceeding with very deliberate 
speed. Langdellian teachers still tell students that they should not take 
clinical courses. There are still clinical teachers who tell students that 
Langdellian classes are of little use. Genuine integration is 
necessarily hard to achieve. But we have made steady progress 
toward the day when no student leaves law school without having 
thought about what it means to use the law in the service of a client 
or a cause. And no student is qualified to seek admission to the bar 
until she has struggled to carve out a professional role that 
responsibly balances service to a client or cause and service to the 
common good.  
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